VCS, INC v. La Salle Development, LLC, America West Bank, Utah Community Bank and Does 1-10 : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2011
VCS, INC v. La Salle Development, LLC, America
West Bank, Utah Community Bank and Does 1-10
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David B. Stevenson; Stevenson & Smith, P.C.; Attorney for Appellant.
Rick L. Sorensen; Hawkins & Sorensen, LC; Matthew J. Ball; Park Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C.;
Larry G. Moore; Ray, Quinney, & Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, VCS, INC v. La Salle Development, No. 20110062.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3089
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
VCS, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
AMERICA WEST BANK, a Utah limited 
liability company, UTAH COMMUNITY 
BANK, a Utah Corporation, and DOES 1-
10, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20110062-SC 
Trial Court No. 080901677 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT VCS, INC. 
On Appeal from the Second District Court in and for the 
County of Weber, State of Utah, Honorable Michael Direda 
Matthew J. Ball 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee Utah Comm. Bank 
Rick L. Sorensen 
Hawkins & Sorensen, LC 
5710 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Attorney for Appellee La Salle Development 
David B. Stevenson, Bar No. 12244 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Appellant VCS, Inc. 
Larry G. Moore 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellee FDIC as receiver 
for America West Bank '=1L£L 
'• trap APPELLATE O 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
VCS, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Vb. 
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
AMERICA WEST BANK, a Utah limited 
liability company, UTAH COMMUNITY 
BANK, a Utah Corporation, and DOES 1-
10, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20110062-SC 
Trial Court No. 080901677 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT VCS, INC. 
On Appeal from the Second District Court in and for the 
County of Weber, State of Utah, Honorable Michael Direda 
Matthew J. Ball 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellee Utah Comm. Bank 
Rick L. Sorensen 
Hawkins & Sorensen, LC 
5710 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
Attorney for Appellee La Salle Development 
David B. Stevenson, Bar No. 12244 
Stevenson & Smith, P.C. 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Appellant VCS, Inc. 
Larry G. Moore 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellee FDIC as receiver 
for America West Bank 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents _ iii 
Table of Authorities y 
Jurisdictional Statement 1 
Statement of the Issues 1 
Statement of the Case 5 
Nature of the Case 5 
Course of Proceedings 5 
Disposition by Trial Court 6 
Statements of Fact 7 
Summary of Arguments ...14 
Argument 18 
I. The Trial Court Erred When It Interpreted Utah Code Annotated §38-1-
11(3) To Void VCS's Lien As Against The Banks For Failure To Timely 
File A Lis Pendens When The Banks Never Owned The Property Until 
After Being Named To The Suit And Where The Banks Obtained Their 
Ownership Through La Salle, Who Was Timely Made A Party To The 
Lawsuit 18 
A. VCS is Entitled to Lien Foreclosure of Lots 5-8, 10-22 and 31 and 32 to 
Satisfy Its Mechanic's Lien. 18 
B. Plaintiff VCS Is Entitled To A Declaratory Judgment That It Has Priority 
Over All Other Lien Claimants 29 
II. The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Find That VCS Had Substantially 
Complied With The Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute 31 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
III. The Trial Court Erred When It Found That VCS's Amended Complaint 
Adding The Banks Did Not Relate Back To The Date Of The Original 
Pleading Under Rule 15 35 
IV. The Trial Court Erred When It Denied VCS's Unjust Enrichment Claim 
Against The Banks Where VCS Brought A Valid Lien Claim Against La 
Salle And Where There Is A Genuine Issues Of Material Fact Concerning 
Whether The Banks Were Unjustly Enriched By VCS's Work On The 
Property 36 
V. The Trial Court Erred When It Set Aside VCS Default Judgment Against 
La Salle For Failure Of Service Where The Assistant For The Registered 
Agent Expressly Stated She Had Permission To Except Service For the 
Registered Agent 40 
Conclusion 46 
Addendum (page numbers listed below) 49 
1. Selected Statute and Regulations 
2. Ruling Granting Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 27 April 2009 (R. at 209-214) 
3. Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, 26 October, 2010 
4. Return of Service 20 Day Summons 
IV 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Table of Authorities 
CASES 
AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986)
 :.18,33 
Beard v. White, Green & Addision Assocs., 336 P.2d 125,126 (Utah 1959) 41 
Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983) ; 33 
Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 45 
Butterfield Lumber Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 1330 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) 15,23,26,27 
Colder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) 40 
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) .44 
Classic Cabinets v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App. 88 43 
DesertMiriah, Inc., v. B&LAuto, Inc., 12 P.3d 580 (Utah2000) 3 
Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 
840 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir.1988) 21,42 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark., 548 P.2d 902,906 (Utah 1976) 35,36 
EDSA/CLOWARD, L.L.C. v. Klibanoff 2005 UT App 367, 122 P.3d 646. 24,30 
Edwards v. Powder Mt. Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App. 185 2,3 
Erickson v. Schenkers Int'I Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) .40 
E.W. Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Utah 1991) 24 
First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979)..18,30 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d288 (Utah 1986) 41 
Garland v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9 Utah 350, 34 P. 368 i 
(1893), aff d, 164 U.S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 7,41 L. Ed. 327 (1896) 19 
Gutierrez v. Medley, 975 P.2d913 (Utah 1998) . 1,2 
i 
In re Schwenke, 2004 UT 17, 89 P.3d 117 (Utah 2009) 42 
Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982) 18 
Interlake Distrib., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 26,27 ' 
Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1988) ...37 
Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maat-Schappij N. V. v. Curtiss- Wright Corp., 
17 F.R.D. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y.1955) 21,43 
Kuhlikv. Atlantic Corp., Ill F.R.D. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ...21,42 
Mini Spas, Inc. V. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) .45 
Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, 10 (2002) \ 35 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738 < 
(Utah 1990) .20 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) 2,3 
Totorica v. Thomas, 397 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1965) ...18 
STATUTES ' 
Utah Code Ann. §16-17-302(1) (2008) .21 
VI i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (2009) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (2011) 16,22,24,30 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(b) (2011) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(A) and (ii)(D) (2009) 19,32 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 (2011) .23 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1-4) (2011) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 (2011) 4,23 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-1-12 (1931) .28 
Utah Code Ann. § 1372 (1898) .28 
Utah Code Ann. § 1391 (1898) 28 
RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Utah Rule 4(d)(1)(E) (2009) 20,21,40 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Utah Rule 7(c)(3)(A)(2011) 38 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) (2009) 35 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55(b)(1)(C) (2008) .44 
UtahR. Civ. P., Rule 60(b) (2008) 40,46 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
2006 Utah Laws 297, 2006 Ut. ALS 297, 2 32 
vn 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
VCS, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Va. 
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
AMERICA WEST BANK, a Utah limited 
liability company, UTAH COMMUNITY 
BANK, a Utah Corporation, and DOES 1-
10, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20110062-SC 
Trial Court No. 080901677 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT VCS, INC. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-1 -11 (3)? 
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the 
district court's legal conclusions. Gutierrez v. Medley, 975 P.2d 913 (Utah 1998). 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the 
following locations: R. at 301-10, 560-62, 564-66; Transcript of Hearing of 20 
September 2010, R. at 711, pp. 6-9, 53, 66-77. 
Did the trial err in voiding VCS, Inc.'s lien against Utah Community Bank and 
America West Bank despite VCS, Inc.'s substantial compliance with the 
provisions of Utah's mechanic's lien law? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a determination of summary judgment, an 
appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and gives 
no particular deference to that court's view of the law. Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Blomquist, 111* P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). The proper 
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. 
Gutierrez v. Medley, 975 P.2d 913 (Utah 1998). 
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the 
following locations: R. at 564-65, 651-52; Transcript of Hearing of 20 September 
2010, R. at 711, pp. 17-19, 24-25, 53, 82-83. 
Did the trial court err in ruling that VCS, Inc.'s amended complaint did not relate 
back under Rule 15(a) for the purposes of the filing date? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's interpretation of 
a rule of procedure for correctness. Edwards v. Powder Ml Water & Sewer, 2009 
UT App. 185 (Utah 2009) In reviewing a determination of summary judgment, an 
appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and gives 
2 
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no particular deference to that court's view of the law. Ron Case Roofing & 
Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved at the following locations: 
R. at 563-64, 650-51; Transcript of Hearing of 20 September 2010, R. at 711, pp. 
6,40,43. 
Did the trial court err in ruling that Utah Community Bank had not been unjustly 
enriched by VCS, Inc.? 
Standard of Review: "Whether a claimant has been unjustly enriched is a mixed 
question of law and fact. . ." Desert Miriah, Inc., v. B &LAuto, Inc., 12 P..3d 
580, 582 (Utah 2000). As such, it will be reversed if clearly erroneous. Id. 
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the 
following pages: R. at 311-12; 566-68, 652-53; Transcript of Hearing of 20 
September 2010, R. at 711, pp. 5, 29-34, 45-49, 62-66, 83. 
5. Did the trial court err in determining that VCS, Inc.'s service of process on La 
Salle was inadequate to sustain a default judgment? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews a district court's interpretation of 
a rule of procedure for correctness. Edwards v. Powder Mt. Water & Sewer, 2009 
UTApp. 185 (Utah 2009). 
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at the 
following pages: R. at 106-13; Transcript of Hearing of 16 April 2009, R. at 710, 
pp. 3-57. 
3 
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Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central important to the appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(2)03) - "Substantial compliance with the requirements of this 
chapter is sufficient to hold and claim a lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(b) (2007). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 - "(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index 
maintained for that purpose. (2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons 
are considered to have notice of the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 (2011). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l ( l ) (a ) -
"(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Owner" is as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(b) "Residence" is as defined in Section 3 8-11 -102. 
(2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter: (a) 
except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), within 180 days after the day on which the lien 
claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7; or (b) if an owner files for 
protection under the bankruptcy laws of the United States before the expiration of the 
180-day period under Subsection (2)(a), within 90 days after the automatic stay under the 
bankruptcy proceeding is lifted or expires. 
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (2) the lien claimant shall 
file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a 
notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title 
or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the 
4 
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commencement of the action, (b) The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those 
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge under Subsection (3)(a).
 1 
(4) (a) A lien filed under this chapter is automatically and immediately void if an action 
to enforce the lien is not filed within the time required by this section, (b) 
Notwithstanding Section 78B-2-111, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a lien that becomes void under Subsection (4)(a)." Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
11(1-4) (2011). < 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
The underlying case is a claim by a general contractor to collect for services and 
materials provided to a subdivision development through lien, breach of contract, and 
unjust enrichment claims. General contractor Plaintiff/Appellants VCS, Inc. (hereinafter 
"VCS"), brought suit against developer Defendant/Appellee La Salle Development, LLC , 
(hereinafter "La Salle") and against two banks, Defendants/ Appellees Utah Community 
Bank and FDIC as receiver for America West Bank (hereinafter "UCB", "FDIC" or 
i 
collectively "the Banks"). 
Course of the Proceedings Below: 
VCS filed suit on 12 March 2008 in the Second Judicial District Court, Weber < 
County, Ogden Department. The Honorable Judge Michael Direda was assigned to the 
case. VCS5 suit alleged four (4) causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) lien 
i 
foreclosure; (3) declaratory relief regarding priority of interests to the real property; and 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(4) quasi contract-unjust enrichment. (R. at 1-10; 177-208; 231-63.) The first cause of 
action for breach of contract was against La Salle alone. The second and third causes of 
action, namely to foreclose its lien and determine the priority of the lien claimants, i.e. 
the priority of the bank versus VCS' mechanics' lien, was against all three Defendants. 
The fourth cause of action for quasi contract-unjust enrichment was also against all three 
Defendants. 
VCS initially filed suit only against La Salle and obtained a default judgment after 
serving the registered agent of La Salle. In a ruling on 27 April 2009 the Court set aside 
the judgment as void under Rule 60(c) because it found Plaintiff failed to serve La Salle 
(allegedly because the registered agent's secretary, who acknowledged in writing she 
could accept for the agent, was not La Salle's secretary, but that of the registered agent's 
personal business). After the default judgment was set aside, VCS amended its complaint 
and added the Banks as Defendants. On 30 March 2010 VCS brought a summary 
judgment motion seeking judgment on its causes of action against La Salle and the Banks 
under it various theories. (R. at 288-508.) On 15 April and 28 April 2010 the Banks 
brought cross motions for summary judgment. (R. at 509-552.) La Salle failed to 
respond to the Plaintiff s motions. 
Disposition By Trial Court: 
In a ruling dated 26 October 2010 the Trial Court declared VCS's lien void and 
granted the banks cross motions for summary judgment. (R. at 646.) It also denied 
Plaintiffs motion as to its claims against the Banks, but granted its motion with respect to 
Plaintiffs breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims against La Salle. (R. at 644-
6 
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55, 689-91.) On 14 December 2010 the Trial Court granted VCS's motion for summary 
judgment against La Salle for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the amount of , 
$218,948.50, but failed to declare VCS's lien valid and order foreclosure of its lien. (R. 
at 689-91.) The Trial Court granted the Banks' motions for summary judgment against 
VCS and awarded the Banks attorney's fees. (R. at 644-55; 682-88.) The final judgment 
appealed from was entered on 14 December 2010. VCS filed a timely Notice of Appeal 
on 12 January 2011. { 
Statements of Fact: 
FACTS RELATED TO LIEN LAW AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
1. Tom Phelps is the owner and operator of VCS, Inc. ("VCS"), a Utah Corporation 
and at all times relevant herein Tom Phelps ("Phelps") was a licensed general 
contractor in the state of Utah. (R. at 317.) 
2. In March 2006, Phelps was contacted by Kyle Lind ("Lind"), a principle and
 ( 
owner of Defendant La Salle Development, LLC ("La Salle"), who asked VCS to 
access and bid the completion of a subdivision called Northpark Meadows (aka 
North Park Meadows), located at approximately 600 E. 4th N. in Ogden, Utah. 
(R. at 317-18, 645.) 
3. La Salle owned nineteen (19) vacant lots in the subdivision, comprising lots 5-8, < 
10-22 and lots 31 and 32 of North Park Meadows. (R. at 318, 344, 645.) 
i 
7 
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4. After obtaining the subcontractor bids, VCS submitted a complete bid to La Salle 
to complete the infrastructure and home construction for the nineteen lots, which 
bid was accepted. (R. at 318.) 
5. VCS and La Salle entered into a written agreement, prepared by Don Hampton of 
La Salle, on 22 February 2007. The combined total expected compensation to 
VCS for the entire project was $192,815.00. (R. at 347-51.) 
6. By October 2006, VCS obtained approval from the city to begin work. (R. at 
319.) 
7. Approximately the first week of November 2006 work began on the project, 
including, but not limited to, construction and installation of storm drain, 
underground detention basin, concrete sidewalk, French drain, silt fence, etc. and 
all the improvements necessary to complete the infrastructure of the subdivision. 
(R. at 319, 645.) 
8. On 12 January 2007 Defendant Utah Community Bank recorded a trust deed dated 
9 January 2007 and La Salle received its first loan for the acquisition and 
development of the project. (R. at 645.) 
9. VCS began home construction in 2007 on four lots, Lots 19-22, for which VCS 
had obtained building permits. (R. at 320, 354-55.) 
10. A Notice of Commencement was filed with the Utah State Contractor Registry for 
the residence construction. (R. at 358-63.) 
11. VCS, Inc. did not receive any payment from La Salle pursuant to their agreement. 
(R. at 320-21.) 
8 
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In approximately April 2007 VCS and Defendant Utah Community Bank 
entered in a written contract that VCS would continue to act as the general , 
contractor for the project in the event that La Salle failed its obligations to the 
bank. (R. at 321.) Utah Community Bank failed to refute that there was a 
i 
written contract in its response to VCS's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
at 512-535.) (Plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 15 and Phelps Second Affidavit No. 
19-20 was not refuted and is therefore deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7 of the { 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
In September 2007 VCS was orally terminated by La Salle, despite being on-
budget and ahead of schedule. (R. at 320, 645.) 
After La Salle received funding from UCB in January 2007, Utah Community 
Bank: (1) was aware that VCS was working on the project; (2) was aware the VCS 
was conferring a substantial benefit to La Salle and to the bank, who had a security 
interest in the property receiving improvements; (3) had insecurity about La
 { 
Salle's ability to make payments and suspected it would have to foreclose on the 
property; (4) knew it would have to pay VCS for its work on the project; (5) knew 
that VCS expected payment; (6) knew that its loan proceeds were used to pay for 
ongoing improvements; (7) kept a Tracking Log of the loan line items and 
expenses/invoices/costs for the project; and (8) knew that VCS was intimately < 
involved in the project and was submitting invoices and/or draws for work done 
by it or its subcontractors as the work was completed on the project. (R. at 319-
21,338,341,472-78,649.) 
9 
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15. VCS' last day of substantial work was September 15, 2007. (R. at 3205 646.) 
16. America West Bank obtained interest in lots 31 and 32 on 24 October 2007. (R. at 
493-99,645.) 
17. VCS filed a lien on 29 January 2008 for worked performed on all nineteen (19) 
lots. The lien was for $1,000.00 per lots 3-18 and 31 and 32, and $17,987.25 per 
lot for lots 19-22, as well as fees, costs and other amounts due and owing, for a 
total of $88,949.00. (R. at 334-35, 366-67, 645-46.) 
18. VCS provided notice of the lien filed to La Salle and to La Salle's registered 
agent, Ted Madsen, via U.S. Mail. The notice was sent out February 1, 2008 by 
certified mail, and was returned with the signature of Ted Madsen, as registered 
agent, and signed by someone on behalf of La Salle. (R. at 321, 370-71.) 
19. The Banks had record notice of the lien as of 29 January 2008 pursuant to U.C.A. 
§38-1-9. 
20. Plaintiff filed suit on 12 March 2008. (R. at 1-11, 645-46.) See also Online 
Docket, case no. 080901677. The suit contained the lien recovery fund 
application forms for application to the fund. (R. at 177, 231, 415-42.) 
21. On 6 June 2008 Plaintiff obtained a default judgment for $90,176.50. (R. at 321, 
370-71.) 
22. On 24 September 2008 VCS filed a Notice of Judgment Lien with the court and 
county recorder. (R. at 21-22.) 
23. On 26 January 2009 Defendant La Salle filed a motion to set aside the judgment. 
(R. at 68-93.) 
10 
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24. On 16 April 2008 the court heard oral argument and determined it would set aside 
the default judgment, which final order was signed on 27 April 2009. (R. at 210, , 
645.) 
25. On 16 October 2008 VCS sent a letter to the UCB and FDIC (at the time, America 
West Bank) informing them of the judgment against La Salle and requesting that 
they stipulate to priority. (R. at 645.) 
26. On 21 April 2009 VCS amended its complaint to correct the contract damages < 
claim and add claims for declaratory relief and unjust enrichment, and 
simultaneously added party Defendants America West Bank and Utah Community 
Bank. (R. at 645.) VCS subsequently amended its complaint again on 18 
December 2009. (R. at 177, 231.) 
27. On 24 April 2009 VCS filed a lis pendens with the Weber County Recorder's * 
office. (R. at 445-47, 645.) 
28. On 30 December 2009 Utah Community Bank became the owner of Lots 5-8, and
 { 
10-22 pursuant to a foreclosure sale on a Trust Deed from La Salle. (R. at 450-52, 
502-03,645.) 
29. UCB obtained ownership to these seventeen (17) lots directly from La Salle (who 
was a party to the lawsuit within 180 days from the date VCS filed its lien) and at 
a time when UCB had actual knowledge of the suit because it and La Salle were < 
already parties to the action. (R. at 450-52, 502-03, 645.) 
30. FDIC is not the owner of lots 31 and 32, but upon information and belief, 
i 
continues to hold a Trust Deed to these lots, (see generally, R. at 645.) 
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31. On 14 December 2010 VCS obtained a judgment against La Salle in the amount of 
$218,948.50 for unjust enrichment. (R. at 689-91.) 
FACTS RELATED TO SERVICE OF PROCESS 
32. La Salle's registered agent on March 19, 2008, was Ted A. Madsen. (R. at 209.) 
33. On March 19, 2008, VCS served La Salle by leaving a copy of the Summons, 
Notice of Mechanic's Lien, Military Service Affidavit and Complaint with a 
receptionist of La Salle's registered agent, Ted Madsen. VCS's Process server, 
Rosemari Green, served receptionist Cailey Tonks, who acknowledged on the 
Summons in her own handwriting, "For Registered Agent Ted Madsen." (R. at 
209,12-13,384-85,388-89.) 
34. Ms. Tonks was not associated with La Salle. (R. at 209-10.) 
35. Process server, Rosemari Green, who had been in business for nineteen years at 
that time, had a processing policy and business practice when serving a summons 
and complaint upon a registered agent of a company to specifically ask for the 
registered agent whose name is on the summons. If he/she are not available to 
accept service of the same, she asks if the receptionist/secretary or person in 
charge if they are authorized to accept service on behalf of the registered agent. 
(R. at 384-85.) 
36. Ms. Honks provided no affidavit. Counsel proffered "I don't remember". R. at 
710, p. 11-12. 
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37. Registered agent Ted Madsen could not remember if he received the complaint 
and allegedly did not provide the complaint to La Salle. (R. at 210.) Mr. Madsen
 { 
could not recall if he received the September 2008 lien sent to him by mail. Id. 
38. La Salle alleged no knowledge of the suit until December 2008, upon receipt of a 
i 
writ of execution by VCS. Id. 
39. La Salle failed to answer the complaint follow service on its registered agent. 
40. Kyle Lind is a non-party who, upon information and belief, has an interest in La < 
Salle. Rick Sorensen is a Utah attorney who represents non-party Kyle Lind in 
several other suits pending in Utah courts and in which VCS, Inc. is also a party. 
(R. at 402.) 
41. After service of the Summons and Complaint upon Defendant, La Salle 
Development, LLC, attorney for VCS, Inc., H. Thomas Stevenson, spoke with 
Rick Sorensen, attorney for Kyle Lind, and on two occasions asked if he 
represented La Salle Development. Rick Sorensen told H. Thomas Stevenson in 
both instances that he did not represent La Salle Development, LLC. At no time 
has Mr. Sorensen indicated to H. Thomas Stevenson that he represents La Salle 
Development, LLC. Id. 
42. On two occasions, Tom Phelps, Terrence Neal, attorney Tom Stevenson, 
representing VCS, Inc., Kyle Lind, and Rick Sorensen, attorney for Kyle Lind, \ 
met at the offices of Stevenson & Smith. (R. at 405-07, 410-12.) 
43. On one of these occasions, which occurred shortly after serving La Salle registered 
agent in March 2008, but before June 6, 2008, when VCS obtained its default 
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judgment, the parties discussed all the complaints that had been filed by VCS, Inc. 
and/or Tom Phelps against Kyle Lind and/or his associated entities. Id. 
44. With regard to an action titled VCS v. Lind et al. (the Bearlake matter) which is in 
First District Court, Tom Stevenson, representing VCS, Inc., granted an open-
ended extension to Kyle Lind and the associated entities who were Defendants in 
that action. Id. 
45. With regard to the VCS, Inc. v. La Salle matter, Rick Sorensen and Kyle Lind 
acknowledged that they knew about the complaint, however, Rick Sorensen stated, 
"I do not represent La Salle Development at this time, however, I may in the 
future.1' Id. 
46. Following this statement, Kyle Lind stated that his partner, Don Hampton, may 
"do something stupid like on the last one." Id. 
47. This statement by Kyle Lind is in reference to the fact that Don Hampton had 
responded to a prior complaint by United Contractors without having talked to 
their attorneys. Id. 
48. Kyle Lind knew about the complaint that was received and which had been served 
on his registered agent, but Kyle Lind!s attorney, Rick Sorensen, indicated that he 
was not representing Defendant, La Salle Development, in the matter. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal concerns whether the court erred: 1) in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-11(3) in such a way as to make the exclusion apply to the 180-day period; 2) in 
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finding that VCS had not substantially complied with the Utah's mechanic's lien law; 3) 
in ruling that VCS, Inc.'s amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(a) to the 
filing date; 4) in ruling that the Banks had not been unjustly enriched by VCS's work on 
the property; and 5) in determining that VCS's service of process on La Salle was 
inadequate to sustain a default judgment. 
The Trial Court found that the language of Utah Code Ann. §38-1-11, requiring 
that a lis pendens be filed within 180 days of the lien filing was ambiguous and unclear. 
As a result it looked to the courts for an interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court 
has not passed upon the issue and the reasoning from two important Appellate Court 
decisions lead to different results. VCS's reading of the current statute, namely that the 
180 day time period does not apply to the exceptions, i.e. to parties named in the suit or 
parties with actual knowledge of the suit, is a reasonable conclusion from reading the 
plain language of the statute. While the Defendant Banks have another interpretation of 
the statute, only VCS's view comports with the expressed intent of the statute to protect 
mechanics work. 
Because of the definition of an owner, and the lien law directive that only an 
owner needs to receive notice of a lien, and the fact the Section 38-1-11 is silent on how 
to handle suits to determine priority among other interest holders after resolving the 
validity of a lien against the property owner, is it questionable whether this subsection to 
anyone but an owner of the property. In the alternative, the Court could follow the 
Butterfield court's reasoning, namely, that since the Banks acquired the property tiirough 
La Salle, an entity who was timely added as an original party to the suit within the 180 
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day statutory period, the lien follows the sale and the Banks therefore did not take the 
property without notice. Butterfield Lumber Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 
1330 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Even the public policy arguments behind the statute~to 
protect materialmen and laborers, and the policy behind the lis pendens requirement— 
namely to prevent the creation of BFPs without notice—is still met by finding that VCS 
complied with the statute. The Defendant Banks are not prejudiced in the least in this 
case because they had knowledge of the suit ten (10) weeks after the 180 day period. 
The purpose behind Section 38-1-1 l's lis pendens and 180 time period 
requirement is to prevent innocent buyers from buying property without notice of a 
pending action. Section 38-1-9 already provides that the notice of lien imputes notice to 
any potential buyer. To the extent 38-1-11 requires more than this, it only lets the 
potential buyer know there is also a suit, which information they could get simply by 
calling the lien claimant if there was a question. If a lis pendens is filed, innocent 
potential buyers will have notice of the pending litigation. However, in this case the lien 
was on title before the suit was filed, and the Banks never sold their interest in their 
property to anyone but themselves. Therefore, there is no bona fide purchaser problem, 
and no issue of notice when they themselves became the owner of the property. Further, 
there is a question about whether a non-owner has the right to challenge a procedurally or 
substantively defective lien because the statute is silent on this point. Under these 
circumstances the Trial Court erred in finding that the 180-day deadline is a bar to 
maintaining a lien. 
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If the Court interprets Section 38-1-11 to require a lis pendens be filed within the 
180-day period regardless of who challenges the lien claimant, i.e that it is inviolate, VCS
 { 
still has a valid lien because of the doctrine of substantial compliance, declared by this 
Court and as codified under Utah Code Ann. §38-1-7. In 2006 the legislature amended 
i 
this section to ensure the doctrine applied to then entire mechanics' lien chapter, not just 
to the subsection. The Court erroneously found that the lis pendens was not a mere 
technicality, but instead a jurisdictional requirement. There is no basis in the code or ( 
legislative history for this finding and it contradicts the law's intent to protect 
materialmen and labors. The Court further found that VCS's amended complaints did not 
relate back to the date of its original pleading, despite the identity of interest the Banks 
had with the property because of their Trust Deeds, and despite how early in the process 
the lawsuit was. 
The Trial Court also erred in dismissing VCS's unjust enrichment claim on the 
grounds that its failure to perfect its lien against the Banks deprived the Court of 
jurisdiction over the issue, despite the fact that VCS had a valid lien against the owner, 
La Salle. There were substantial disputes facts regarding Utah Community Bank's 
knowledge of VCS's actions, including an undisputed fact regarding a written contract 
between the Bank to pay VCS to complete the subdivision if La Salle did not. 
Finally, the Trial Court erred when it found that service was ineffective on LaSalle < 
when its registered agent's assistant expressly agreed she had authority to accept service 
on his behalf. For these reasons VCS respectfully request that the Appellate Court 
reverse the court below. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred When It Interpreted Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-
11(3) To Void VCS's Lien As Against The Banks For Failure To Timely File 
A Lis Pendens When The Banks Never Owned The Property Until After 
Being Named To The Suit And Where The Banks Obtained Their Ownership 
Through La Salle, Who Was Timely Made A Party To The Lawsuit 
A. VCS is Entitled to Lien Foreclosure of Lots 5-8,10-22 and 31 and 32 to 
Satisfy Its Mechanic's Lien. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 contractors such as VCS are entitled to file a 
lien for improvements to property. U.C.A. § 38-1-3 (2009). The term improvement 
encompasses installation of infrastructure, such as sewer and water systems on property, 
as well as construction of residences. First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel & 
Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). The purpose of this statute "is to provide protection 
to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or materials." AAA 
Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). The law 
is intended for the benefit of those who perform labor and supply materials. Totorica v. 
Thomas, 397 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1965). In order to achieve this purpose, Utah courts 
construe the statute broadly. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 
(Utah 1982). A valid mechanic's lien is created where, as here, a contract is repudiated 
after work has commenced or after materials have been furnished. U.C.A. § 38-1-
1 l(l)(a)(2)(D); Garland v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 9 Utah 350, 
34 P. 368 (1893), affd, 164 U.S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 7, 41 L. Ed. 327 (1896). 
For VCS to establish that it has a valid lien it must show: 
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(1) it filed a lien within 180 days of the "last date on which substantial work 
was performed under the original contract". U.C.A. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(A) 
and (ii)(D) (2009). 
(2) it filed an action to enforce the lien within 180 days from the day it filed a 
notice of claim under Section 38-1-7. U.C.A. § 38-1-11(2). 
(3) it did one of the following: a) filed a notice of the action with the county 
recorder within 180 days, b) included the owner of the property as a party 
to the action, or c) provided actual knowledge of the commencement of the 
action to the owner of the property. Id. at (3)(a). 
(4) that it delivered or mailed by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to 
the reputed or record owner of the real property. Id. (3)(a) and (c). 
Requirements 1,2, and 4 above are easily dispensed with. The last substantial 
work completed by VCS was on September 15, 2007. VCS filed a lien on lots 3-22 and 
lots 31 and 32 on 29 January 2008, which was less than 180 days from the date of the last 
substantial work completed. The lien amount was for a total of $88,949.00. This satisfies 
requirement No. 1 above. VCS filed suit against the property owner, Defendant La Salle, 
on 12 March 2008, which was less than 180 days from the date the lien was filed. This 
satisfies requirement No. 2 above. The lien was mailed to the property owner and to its 
registered agent by certified mail on February 1, 2008, which is well within 180 days 
from the date the lien was recorded, 29 January 2008. Therefore Plaintiff may be 
awarded his attorney's fees and costs for enforcing its mechanic's lien under the statute. 
There are a host of other requirements concerning the content of these notices, none of 
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which are disputed by any of the Defendants. The real dispute in this case concerns the 
third requirement above and the interpretation of the statutory language. 
While a lis pendens of the proceeding was not filed until April 2009, the statute 
does not require VCS to provide this notice against a Defendant to the lawsuit. U.C.A. § 
38-1-11(3): Projects Unlimited Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.. 1990, 798 P.2d 
738 (only when mechanic's lienor fails to timely record lis pendens can a Defendant 
argue that it is not subject to mechanic's lien, and then only if such person was not named 
as party to foreclosure action and did not have actual knowledge of action). At the time 
of filing the lien and foreclosure suit, the owner of the property was Defendant La Salle, a 
party to the action. Therefore, No. 3 above is satisfied as to La Salle. 
Not only was La Salle listed as a party, it also had actual knowledge of the suit. 
Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure service of process is effective by 
delivering the summons and complaint to an "officer, a managing or general agent, or 
other agent authorized by appointment or by law". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(d)(1)(E) 
(2008). In this case the process server, Rose Green, served Defendant La Salle on 19 
March 2008. Ms. Green had a business practice of first inquiring if the person is the 
registered agent and second, if they were not, requesting to know if the person could 
accept process for the Registered Agent. Ms. Cailey Tonks, the registered agent's 
assistant, expressly stated she would accept service and even wrote the words, "FOR 
REGISTERED AGENT TED MADSEN" on the front sheet of the Summons below her 
signature. 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Receptionists can have implied authority to accept service of process where that 
receptionist stated they could accept the summons. Kuhlik v. Atlantic Corp., 112 F.R.D. 
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 
840 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir.1988) (finding service on receptionist effective where 
corporation was comparatively small and the role played by receptionist was 
proportionally large, and receptionist was the only one in the office when the process 
server arrived, indicating that she possessed more than minimal responsibility); 
Koninkliike Luchtvaart Maat-Schappii N.V. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 17 F.R.D. 49, 51 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding face-to-face encounter with corporate officer not required to 
effect service where the officer's receptionist accepted service, promised to deliver the 
papers to the proper person, and did in fact deliver the papers). All the current rule 
requires is that the person be "authorized" or a "general agent". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 
4(d)(1)(E) (2008). Ms. Tonks' written statement satisfies this Rule. Registered agents 
have a duty to "forward to the represented entity . . . any process, notice, or demand that 
is served on the agent." U.C.A. §16-17-302(1) (2008). 
In addition, in a meeting between La Salle and VCS and their respective counsel, 
held between March 12, 2008, when the complaint was filed, and June 6, 2008, when the 
default was entered, La Salle acknowledged receipt and knowledge of the complaint 
during a meeting between officers of La Salle and VCS. The parties present were Kyle 
Lind, officer for La Salle, Rick Sorensen, La Salle's current attorney, Tom Stevenson, 
VCS' attorney, and Terrance Neal and Tom Phelps, officers of VCS. Kyle Lind 
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acknowledged in that meeting that he knew about the La Salle complaint prior to the 
default judgment on June 6, 2008. 
The fact that 1) the receptionist had implied authority to accept service, 2) she 
accepted service, and 3) Kyle Lind acknowledged receipt of the Complaint prior to the 
judgment being entered, as proven by at least two affidavits, shows that Defendant La 
Salle received the complaint and summons. As noted above, making La Salle a 
Defendant in the pending action is enough to satisfy requirement No. 3, even absent this 
actual knowledge.1 
In December 2009 Defendant Utah Community Bank foreclosed on seventeen of 
La Salle's remaining lots. At that time, Utah Community Bank became the record owner, 
but took the property subject to any valid liens. See U.C.A. § 38-1-5. Prior to this time, 
on 21 April 2009 and 18 December 2009, Plaintiff amended its complaint to add Utah 
Community Bank and America West Bank as Defendants. While the lien statutes do not 
require Plaintiff to bring the lenders as party-defendants in order to establish that it has a 
valid lien against property owner La Salle, these entities were added as Defendants so 
that the court could make a determination concerning priority of the encumbrances, not 
because of some duty required by the lien statutes. The lien notice requirements do not 
apply to these Defendants, even though they had actual and record notice of the action 
well prior to becoming owners of the property. 
The dispositive question for the Court concerns interpretation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-1-11(3) in relation to non property owners. Interpreting this section 
1
 Service of process is the subject of Section V. infra. 
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raises numerous questions upon which the statute is silent and which are matters of first 
impression to the Utah Supreme Court. 
First, who must a lien claimant sue? Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-7 requires that a 
lien must be filed against the "owner" of the property and that a notice of claim must be 
sent only to the reputed or record owner. It is silent as to whether the notice should or 
must be sent to equitable interest holders, such as lenders, or to other known lien 
claimants. However, § 38-1-9 expressly imputes record notice to other interest holders 
once the lien is filed with the county recorded. It states: "[fjrom the time the claim is 
filed for record, all persons are considered to have notice of the claim". Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-9 (2011). Therefore, the Banks were imputed knowledge of the notice of claim 
before the suit was even instituted. Presumably, if notice must only go to the "owner", it 
is logical that the suit for lien foreclosure should only be against that same "owner". The 
term owner is defined in § 38-1-11 (and therefore by reference, § 38-11-102) to exclude 
lenders who are not actual property owners. 
Second, the Court of Appeals found that, in relation to § 38-1-11(3), there are two 
competing interests-that of protecting materialmen and laborers, and that of protecting 
innocent third party purchasers without notice of a lien foreclosure action. Butterfield 
Lumber v. Peterson Mortgage Corporation, 815 P.2d 1330,1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If 
there is no innocent third party purchaser without notice, but the Plaintiff failed to file a 
lis pendens, is the lis pendens requirement mandatory where, as here, the Banks are not 
prejudiced in any way by being made a party? 
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Third, how must a lien claimant determine priority of its interests versus other 
interest holders? Priority of liens and interest holders can be accomplished via a 
declaratory judgment action and Section 38-1-5 delineates how to determine priority 
among interest holders. However, Section 38-1-11 is silent about who to include in the 
action. Recording a notice of lien does not establish priority of the claim under this 
chapter. E.W. Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC 776 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Utah 1991). Under § 38-
1-5, visible commencement of work, not record notice, establishes priority. 
EDSA/CLOWARD. L.L.C. v. Klibanoff 2005 UT App 367, 122 P.3d 646. Must the 
valid lien holder bring all interest holders in the original Section 38-1-11 suit, or may it 
amend the lien foreclosure suit against the owner to determine priority after having 
determined its lien was valid? Or can the lien claimant seek declaratory relief in a 
separate suit? Again, here the statute is silent. 
Fourth, does the substantial compliance provision in Section 38-1-7, which was 
amended in 2006 to expressly apply to the entire Chapter for mechanics' liens (versus 
just that subsection), effect the case law predating that change? Does the language of that 
section stating that substantial compliance with the chapter is "sufficient to hold and 
claim a lien" effect the provisions of Section 38-1-11? 
Fifth, is Section 38-1-11(3) jurisdictional or a statute of limitations that Plaintiff 
can overcome through relation back under Rule 15? 
Sixth, do non-property owners with interests in real property have standing to 
challenge the procedural and/or substantive aspects of a lien foreclosure action? 
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Seventh, must a lis pendens be filed within 180 days of the lien filing whether the 
entity is made a party to the lawsuit before becoming the owner of the property? 
Eighth, does the fact that a bank conducts a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on a trust 
deed held by a party timely added to the lawsuit (i.e. within the 180 days) mean that 
whomever bought the property, whether via credit bid or otherwise, is imparted notice of 
the suit, even if a lis pendens was not filed within the 180 day period? Because the 
statute is silent on these related issues, VCS asks that it be found void for vagueness. 
The specific language in question is as follows: 
2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed 
under this chapter: (a) except as provided in Subsection 
(2)(b), within 180 days after the day on which the lien 
claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1 -7; or (b) if 
an owner files for protection under the bankruptcy laws of the 
United States before the expiration of the 180-day period 
under Subsection (2)(a), within 90 days after the automatic 
stay under the bankruptcy proceeding is lifted or expires. 
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in 
Subsection (2) the lien claimant shall file for record with the 
county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a 
notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided 
in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real 
property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, (b) 
The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those 
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge 
under Subsection (3)(a). 
U.C.A. § 38-1-11(2) and (3) (2011) (emphasis added). 
The Trial Court found the language in § 38-1-11(3) ambiguous and unclear and 
therefore found it necessary to look to controlling precedent, stating, 
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"[e]ach party has interpreted §38-1-11 (3)(a) based upon the 
statute's plain meaning and reached different results: Plaintiff 
argues that the exceptions to a void lien—namely, naming a 
party in a foreclosure action or proving actual knowledge of 
the action—are not subject to the 180 day requirement while 
both UCB and FDIC argue that the exceptions are subject to 
the time requirement. Because the Court finds that the 
language of the statute by itself is unclear as to whether or not 
the 180 day requirement applies to the exceptions, the Court 
must look at controlling precedent for an interpretation of the 
statute."). 
(R. at 647.) Ultimately, the Trial Court concluded that the Court of Appeals rulings in 
Butterfield and Interlake Distrib., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) were dispositive of the issue and declared VCS's lien void. That 
interpretation of the statute, namely, to require equitable interest holders be given actual 
notice or be named as parties to the action within 180 days, controverts the statute's 
purpose of protecting lienholders by allowing equitable interest holders to procedurally 
and substantively use the statute as a shield. Furthermore, that result is inconsistent with 
those court's findings. 
The Butterfield court found that "where the holder of a valid mechanics' lien has 
timely begun judicial lien foreclosure proceedings, and a party holding a property interest 
that is subject to the lien, aware of the pending foreclosure, disposes of the property to 
one who takes it free of the lien the lien attaches to the proceeds gained from the sale." 
Butterfield Lumber v. Peterson Mortgage Corporation, 815 P.2d at 1335. In Butterfield 
the Peterson Mortgage was timely made a party to the action, and then it sold its interest 
to an innocent purchaser without notice of the cause of action. The Plaintiff failed to file 
a lis pendens. The court found that the Butterfield lien was enforceable against the third 
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party purchaser because it obtained the property from Peterson, who had timely actual 
knowledge of the lien action and was a party timely added before the deadline (which at 
that time was 12 months from the lien filing). Id. 
The facts are the same here. Utah Community Bank obtained its interest in the 
property from La Salle, who had timely actual knowledge of the lien action and who was 
made a party within the 180 day period. The only difference is how that interest in the 
property was obtained. In Butterfield is was through a sale to the third party. In this case 
it is through a non-judicial foreclosure sale. 
Interlake leads to the same conclusion. In that case the Plaintiff sued lender 
Deseret Pacific in October 1985, but never served them. The property owner, Old Mill 
Towne defaults and Deseret foreclosed. Old Mill Towne, Inc., a separate entity from Old 
Mill Towne, obtained the property in December 1989 and that entity requested to 
intervene in the suit in 1991, and was subsequently joined in the suit. The Plaintiff did 
not add Old Mill Towne, Inc. as a party and never filed a lis pendens. In that case, the 
court concluded that neither Defendant had knowledge of the case within the year 
statutory period and found that the lien was void. Interlake, 954 P.2d at 1296. However, 
the Interlake decision was in 1988 and Butterfield decision came afterwards in 1991. If 
the reasoning in Butterfield is used on the facts of Interlake, the court would have reached 
the opposite result. In Interlake, Defendant Old Mill Towne obtained the property from 
Deseret, who was a party to the original proceeding, which was filed timely. But Deseret 
was not served, a fact not present in the current case. Furthermore, both of these cases 
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predate the 2006 change to Utah lien law that made the principle of substantial 
compliance applicable to the entire chapter, as discussed in Section II., Infra. 
The legislative history and prior versions of the statutes provide little insight as 
well. Utah lien law, first enacted in 1898, Utah Code Ann. § 1372 did not contain a lis 
pendens requirement as found in the current statute. But U.C.A. § 1391, also enacted at 
the same time, required that notice be published in the newspaper to allow other interest 
holders to make claims at the hearing on the lien. Id. In 1931 the legislature renumbered 
the section as U.C.A. Section 52-1-12/C.L.16 and added the current lis pendens 
requirement (but without the current exceptions for parties named and having actual 
knowledge), but still continued to require the notice publications. It is unclear when the 
publication requirement stopped or whether the lis pendens requirement first began. 
VCS's reading of the current statute, namely that the 180 day time period does not 
apply to the exceptions, is a reasonable conclusion from reading the plain language of the 
statute. In the alternative, the Court can find that the subsection only applies to the 
reputed/record owner, not to equitable lien holders. Or, also in the alternative, the Court 
could follow the Butterfield court's reasoning, namely that since the Banks acquired the 
property through La Salle, who was timely added to the suit within the 180 days, the lien 
follows the sale and the Banks therefore did not take the property without notice. 
Notwithstanding all these options for allowing the lien to be valid, the public policy 
behind the statute (to protect materialmen and laborers) and the policy behind the lis 
pendens requirement (namely to prevent the creation of BFPs without notice) is still met 
by finding that VCS complied with the statute. 
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( 
The purpose behind Section 38-1-1 l's lis pendens and 180-day time period 
requirement must be to prevent innocent buyers from buying property without notice of a < 
pending action. Section 38-1-9 already provides that the notice of lien imputes notice to 
any potential buyer. To the extent 38-1-11 requires more than this, it only lets the 
i 
potential buyer know there is also a suit, which information they could get simply by 
calling the lien claimant if there was a question. If a lis pendens is filed, innocent 
potential buyers will have notice of the pending litigation. However, in this case the lien { 
was on title before the suit was filed, and the Banks never sold their interest in their 
property to anyone but themselves. Therefore, there is no bona fide purchaser problem, 
and no issue of notice when they became the owner of the property. Further, the statute 
is silent about whether a nonowner ever has the right to challenge a procedurally or 
i 
substantively defective lien. 
For the foregoing reasons, VCS urges the Court to reverse the Trial Court's 
finding that VCS lien is invalid, and Order that it has a valid lien in the amount of 
$88,949.00 over lots 5-8, 10-22 and 31 and 32 of the Meadow's Park Subdivision. VCS 
requests an order of judicial foreclosure of said lots to pay Plaintiff VCS for the amount 
of this lien, its lien filing costs, court costs, and attorney's fees to-date in order to enforce 
this lien. 
B. Plaintiff VCS Is Entitled To A Declaratory Judgment That It Has Priority 
Over All Other Lien Claimants. 
Plaintiff seeks a court order that it has priority over other encumbrances. U.C.A. § 
38-1-5 establishes priority of encumbrances and states: 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take 
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or 
furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage 
or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently 
to the time when the building, improvement or structure was 
commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the 
ground: also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of 
which the lien holder had no notice and which was 
unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement 
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on 
the ground. 
U.C.A. § 38-1-5 (2009). The date a contractor first begins its work on or supplies 
materials to a project determines when the mechanic's lien arose. A lien for work on the 
overall site (i.e. entire project), as well as work on individual building units located on the 
site, all relate back to the date the initial work was done on the project. First of Denver 
Mtg. Investors, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah, 1979) (mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing 
of materials and labor-both on the 44-acre site as well as on individual condominium 
units in the development-related back to the initial work done on the project). Record 
notice does not establish priority. It is actual notice of the initiation of work or, at 
minimum, visible commencement of work that establishes priority. EDSA/CLOWARD 
L.L.C. v. Klibanofil 2005 UT App. 367, 122 P.3d 646. 
In this case Plaintiff began physical on-site infrastructure work on the project by 
the first week of November 2006, including, but not limited to, construction and 
installation of storm drain, underground detention basin, concrete sidewalk, French drain, 
silt fence, etc. and all the improvements necessary to complete the infrastructure of the 
subdivision. 
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Utah Community Bank did not make a loan to La Salle for the project until 9 
January 2007, which was recorded on January 12, 2007. America West Bank's interest, 
as recorded by trust deed, occurred on 24 October 2007. Because the banks obtained 
their interest in the property after Plaintiff commenced work, Plaintiffs interest relates 
back to at least November 2006, well in advance of the bank party-Defendants' trust 
deeds and interest. 
VCS seeks an order from the Court declaring that VCS's lien is valid and was 
prior to Utah Community Bank's and America West Bank's interests in the property, and 
that the Bank's interest, as well as that of their successor or assigns, is subordinate to the 
mechanic's lien of VCS pursuant to Section 38-1-5. 
II. The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Find That VCS Had Substantially 
Complied With The Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute. 
In the alternative, VCS's substantial compliance with Utah's Mechanic's Lien law 
fulfilled the statutory intent of Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-7 and 38-1-11, and it is therefore 
entitled to foreclose on the property. With the exception of Section 38-1-11(3), that Trial 
Court found that VCS had "strictly" complied with all other requirements of the lien 
statute. (R. at 646.) 
The Utah Mechanics' Lien statute is found in Chapter 1 of Title 38. Specifically, 
the 2006 amendment by ch. 297, effective May 1, 2006, substituted "this chapter" for 
"this Subsection (2)" in Subsection (2)(b) of Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-7. 2006 
Utah Laws 297. The specific language change, as reflected in the new session law, is 
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"Substantial compliance with the requirements of this [D> Subsection (2) <D] [A> 
CHAPTER <A] is sufficient to hold and claim a lien." 2006 Utah Laws 297, 2006 Ut 
ALS 297, 2 (emphasis added). 
This important language change shows the Utah Legislature's intent to allow lien 
claimants to substantially comply with any section or subsection within the entire 
mechanics' lien Chapter. Because the legislature intended this principle of substantial 
compliance to apply to all of Chapter 1, substantial compliance with § 38-1-11 is 
expressly allowed by statute and is sufficient if a Utah court finds the lien claimant 
'substantially' met the requirements of that section. 
As noted supra, for VCS to establish that it has a valid lien it must show: 
(1) it filed a lien within 180 days of the "last date on which substantial work 
was performed under the original contract". U.C.A. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(A) 
and (ii)(D) (2009). 
(2) it filed an action to enforce the lien within 180 days from the day it filed a 
notice of claim under Section 38-1-7. U.C.A. § 38-1-11(2). 
(3) it did one of the following: a) filed a notice of the action with the county 
recorder within 180 days, b) included the owner of the property as a party 
to the action, or c) provided actual knowledge of the commencement of the 
action to the owner of the property. Id. at (3)(a). 
(4) that it delivered or mailed by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to 
the reputed or record owner of the real property. Id. (3)(a) and (c). 
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VCS complied with these requirements, along with myriad other requirements 
incorporated into the first two requirements (dates, times, places, signatures, lien 
amounts, work completed, etc.). In addition, VCS did provide actual notice to the Banks 
on October 16, 2008, approximately 8 and a Vi months after filing its lien, it filed a lis 
pendens, it added the Banks as defendants to the case, etc. If the Court finds VCS did not 
comply with Section 3 8-1 -11 (3), that failure is a mere technicality. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this point many years before the legislature 
did in Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983). The Court stated, "[t]he doctrine 
of substantial compliance has validity and it has application in an appropriate case ." Id. 
at 722. The Court went on to suggest that the Court is "fee to discount" 
hypertechnicalities. Id. 
As has already been noted, Utah courts have indicated that Utah's Mechanic's 
Lien Law was implemented for the benefit of those persons that enhance the value of a 
property by supplying labor or materials. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy 
Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 directs a lien claimant to 
file an action to enforce the lien within 180 days from the filing of the lien. During the 
statutory period designated for enforcement, Plaintiff not only filed an action to enforce 
its lien, but also received a default judgment recognizing the validity of Plaintiff s lien. 
In an effort to protect third party bona fide purchasers who acquire an interest in 
the property without knowledge of an existing encumbrance, § 38-1-11 also includes a 
requirement to file a lis pendens. Well in advance of Defendant UCB's acquisition of an 
interest in the property, Plaintiff gave Defendant UCB actual notice of the pendency of its 
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lien foreclosure action, and named Defendant UCB as a party to the action. Despite the 
absence of a lis pendens filing, Defendant UCB had been given actual notice of 
Plaintiffs pending action, thus fulfilling the purpose of § 38-1-1 l's lis pendens 
requirement. Plaintiffs substantial compliance with the statute ensured that the policy 
considerations underlying the lis pendens requirement had all been addressed, and that 
Defendant UCB could not be unfairly prejudiced by the absence of the lis pendens filing. 
Furthermore, at the conclusion of 180 day statutory period for enforcement, 
Plaintiff was in possession of a default judgment entitling Plaintiff to foreclose on the 
property in satisfaction of its lien. Plaintiff therefore had no reason to believe a lis 
pendens was necessary. At that time, upon information and belief, there was equity in 
the property and even if VCS's lien did not have first priority, it could foreclose on the 
property subject to any higher-priority interests. When this Court later set aside that 
default judgment, Plaintiff promptly gave Defendant UCB actual notice of its pending 
lien action, and subsequently named Defendant UCB as a party to the action and filed a 
lis pendens, all well in advance of UCB5 s later acquisition of an interest in the property. 
Thus, Defendant UCB should not be allowed to distort Utah's Mechanic's Lien law to its 
own advantage at the expense of those, like Plaintiff, for whom the law's protections 
were intended. 
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III. The Trial Court Erred When It Found That VCS's Amended Complaint 
Adding The Banks Did Not Relate Back To The Date Of The Original 
Pleading Under Rule 15. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(c), Plaintiffs Amended Complaint adding 
Defendant UCB to the action relates back to date of the original pleading, since 
Defendant UCB, as an equitable owner of the property, had an identity of interest with 
Defendant La Salle. Although Rule 15 generally does not permit relation back to an 
amendment adding a party, an exception exists when the added party has an identity of 
interest with the original named party. Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 
(Utah 1976). A party added during an amendment has an identity of interest when it has 
been "sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from 
an early stage." Id. Involvement at an early stage includes the period of time before a 
scheduling order has been entered, before a trial date is set, and before discovery has 
taken place or is ongoing. See Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, 10 (2002) 
(allowing a plaintiffs amended complaint adding a defendant to relate back under Rule 
15). Relation back as to a party with this identity of interest is proper since the party's 
involvement negates any prejudice against it. At the time that Plaintiff amended its 
Complaint to add Defendant UCB, no scheduling order had been entered, no trial date 
had been set, and discovery had not yet started. The case was clearly at an early stage. 
The rationale behind the identity of interest exception is to prevent a mechanical 
use of a statute of limitations to prevent adjudication of a claim. Doxev-Lavton, 548 P.2d 
at 906. Defendant UCB, fully aware of Plaintiff s superior lien at the time it foreclosed 
on the property, did so in a mechanical effort to use a perceived statute of limitations to 
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prevent Plaintiffs adjudication of its claim. It was already a party to the suit at the time 
of foreclosure and took the property from La Salle, who was properly part of the lien suit. 
Thus, Defendant UCB has an identity of interest with Defendant La Salle, and relation 
back of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint adding Defendant UCB is proper. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred When It Denied VCS's Unjust Enrichment Claim 
Against The Banks Where VCS Brought A Valid Lien Claim Against La Salle 
And Where There Is A Genuine Issues Of Material Fact Concerning Whether 
The Banks Were Unjustly Enriched By VCS's Work On The Property. 
In approximately April 2007, Plaintiffs sole owner, Tom Phelps, met with 
Defendant Utah Community Bank. At that time, VCS and Utah Community Bank 
entered into a contract in which VCS would complete the construction of the homes if La 
Salle were somehow to fail in meeting their obligations to the Bank. Id. While VCS 
never had to fulfill this requirement because it was terminated by La Salle, Utah 
Community Bank's decision to make this agreement shows that Defendant Utah 
Community Bank: (1) was aware that VCS was working on the project; (2) was aware the 
VCS was conferring a substantial benefit to La Salle and to the bank, who had a security 
interest in the property receiving improvements; (3) had insecurity about La Salle's 
ability to make payments and suspected it would have to foreclose on the property1; (4) 
knew it would have to pay VCS for that benefit; and (5) knew that VCS expected 
payment. In addition, Exhibit R shows Utah Community Bank's home construction loan 
*As they ultimately did on 30 December 2009. 
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line items for lots 19-22, that VCS was submitting invoices and/or draws as the work was 
completed on the project, and that the Bank knew of VCS involvement on the project. •< 
Because of these facts, a quasi contract existed between Utah Community Bank 
and VCS. It would be inequitable for Utah Community Bank to retain the benefits of 
VCS5 work without payment of its value. Therefore, Plaintiff urges that the Court find 
that Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $88,949.00, which is the total work 
that Utah Community Bank benefitted from, plus interest, costs and attorney's fees, on 
the grounds of quantum meruit and/or unjust enrichment. 
Plaintiff has not failed to exhaust its legal remedies in pursuing recovery, and 
therefore is entitled to summary judgment for unjust enrichment. Defendant UCB cites 
Knight v. Post for the proposition that failing to exhaust ones legal remedies bars a claim 
for unjust enrichment. 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Knight the plaintiff 
failed to perfect its mechanic's lien, failed to bring an action to enforce the lien, and 
failed to pursue a claim in bankruptcy to recover. Id. at 1100. Because the Plaintiff was 
dilatory, and failed to seek recovery before these remedies had expired, the court refused 
to allow the plaintiff to bring a tardy claim for unjust enrichment. Id Unlike the facts in 
Knight in the present case, Plaintiff has not exhausted its legal remedies, but is actively 
seeking to enforce them. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of lien, and properly brought an 
action to enforce the lien. Under any scenario, the Court erroneously found that VCS's 
lien was void. (R. at 646-50.) And, as shown above, UCB knowledge of the lien and 
foreclosure action and its being named as a party prior to its ownership of the property 
comply with both the technical terms of the lien statute and its intent. The pendency of 
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this action is proof that Plaintiffs legal remedies are not exhausted, and a claim for unjust 
enrichment is not barred. Therefore, Defendant UCB was not entitled to summary 
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim. 
In addition, it is uncontroverted that Defendant UCB entered into an 
agreement in 2007 with VCS for VCS to act as the general contractor to complete 
the construction in the event that La Salle was unable to complete the project and/or 
failed to meet its financial obligations. (R. at 321.) Utah Community Bank failed to 
refute that there was a written contract in its response to VCS's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 512-535.) (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 15 and Phelps Second Affidavit No. 19-20). 
Therefore, this statement is deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
In addition, there are questions of fact concerning whether Utah Community Bank 
was unjustly enriched because of the following facts. UCB: (1) was aware that VCS was 
working on the project; (2) was aware the VCS was conferring a substantial benefit to La 
Salle and to the bank, who had a security interest in the property receiving improvements; 
(3) had insecurity about La Salle's ability to make payments and suspected it would have 
to foreclose on the property; (4) knew it would have to pay VCS for its work on the 
project; (5) knew that VCS expected payment; (6) knew that its loan proceeds were used 
to pay for ongoing improvements; (7) kept a Tracking Log of the loan line items and 
expenses/invoices/costs for the project; and (8) knew that VCS was intimately involved 
in the project and was submitting invoices and/or draws for work done by it or its 
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subcontractors as the work was completed on the project. (R. at 319-21, 338, 341, 472-
78, 649.) For these reasons alone the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment for 
theUCB. 
In 2007 UCB had knowledge of VCS's work on the project and intended for VCS 
to work on the project even if the then current owner, La Salle, were not able to continue 
to employ VCS. La Salle removed VCS as the general contractor long before La Salle 
lost the property, so UCB never required that VCS complete the project according to their 
agreement. Still, this shows that UCB unequivocally knew that VCS was working on 
property in which it had an equitable and, later, a legal interest, and intended to benefit 
from VCS's work if La Salle's interest in the property were foreclosed on—which is 
exactly what happened. 
In addition, UCB made payments for VCS's work directly to subcontractors, for 
permitting, etc. and was intimately familiar with the work by VCS and its subcontractors 
on the project. There is no factual dispute that VCS conferred a benefit on UCB, that 
UCB retained that benefit, and that, under these circumstances, it would be unjust for 
UCB to retain the benefit of that work without paying for that benefit. Now, when the 
Bank sells the lot, it can get more money for it because of VCS's efforts. 
V. The Trial Court Erred When It Set Aside VCS Default Judgment Against La 
Salle For Failure Of Service Where The Assistant For The Registered Agent 
Expressly Stated She Had Permission To Except Service For the Registered 
Agent. 
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The Trial Court found that leaving a copy of a summons and complaint with the 
secretary of the registered agent constituted improper service. (R. at 210-11.) As a 
result, the Trial Court set aside VCS's initial default judgment in 2008. While VCS 
eventually obtained a judgment against La Salle for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment, VCS prefers to have the initial judgment stand because it allows VCS to 
have its judgment first in time over subsequent liens or interest holders. 
In order to be relieved of a judgment under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a defendant must show: 1) that the judgment was entered against her because 
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) that she has a meritorious 
defense; and 3) that the motion was timely made. See Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l 
Forwarders. Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994). Each of these requirements is 
analyzed below. Default judgments are set aside under Rule 55 using the same criteria in 
Utah. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
A. The Defendant's Inexcusable Neglect Is Shown By Its Failure To Act On Its 
Receipt of the Summons and Complaint 
Under Rule 4 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure service of process is effective 
by delivering the summons and complaint to an "officer, a managing or general agent, or 
other agent authorized by appointment or by law". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(d)(1)(E) 
(2008). Utah courts have interpreted the prior version of this Rule as prohibiting service 
upon a person who is a mere employee. Beard v. White, Green & Addision Assocs., 336 
P.2d 125,126 (Utah 1959) (person accepting service must be "must be in charge of some 
of its property, operations, business activities, office, place of business or in some manner 
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be responsible for or have control over its affairs.")- Not only was this ruling based in 
part on the prior version of the Rule, but the facts of that case are distinguishable. 
In Beard, the officer who effected service claimed he served Bottomley, and 
alleged that Bottomley claimed he was a foreman. This was controverted by the 
testimony of "Bottomley, Miller and White that Bottomley was not a foreman, and that 
Miller was the foreman, and the uncontradicted testimony that Miller had been so held 
out and introduced to the sheriff and his deputy who made the service as such.. . ." Id. As 
a result, the Court found that the trial court's decision that there was service was 
unreasonable and contrary to the evidence. Id. 
In contrast to Beard, in this case the process server, Rose Green, had a business 
practice of first inquiring if the person is the registered agent and second, if they were 
not, requesting to know if the person could accept process for the Registered Agent. 
Green Aff.f2-3. Here, Ms. Cailey Tonks expressly stated she would accept service and 
even wrote the words, "FOR REGISTERED AGENT TED MADSEN" on the from sheet 
of the Summons below her signature. Id. 
Defendant attempts to support the idea that a Summons and Complaint cannot be 
left with just anyone at the business site misses the mark. Defendant first cites to Garcia 
v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). This is a case concerning the Court's striking down 
of service on a prisoner officer for an inmate. This is distinguishable on the grounds that 
first, such service is controlled by statute, and secondly it is not a case concerning a 
registered agent for a corporation in the state controlled by Rule 4(d)(1)(E). Nor is it a 
case where an agent for the registered agent accepts service. 
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Equally unavailing is Defendant's reliance on In re Schwenke. 2004 UT 2004 UT 
17, 89 P.3d 117. That case concerned a disbarred attorney's service of petition for 
reinstatement on common-area receptionist at the Utah Law and Justice Center. The 
Court found that the service did not constitute effective service of process on the Office 
of Professional Conduct (OPC), and was thus not sufficient to begin 60-day time limit for 
OPC to file its objection. In that case the receptionist was not supervised or employed by 
OPC, was not authorized to accept service on behalf of OPC, did not deliver documents 
to OPC, was not told that petition was intended for OPC, and the process server received 
no assurances that the petition would be delivered to OPC. Id. at f24-2 5. The same 
Court also stated" Courts have often found service to be effective where the employee 
who received service had a significant amount of authority or apparent authority within 
the organization; where the employee played an integrated role within the organization 
such that he or she would know what to do with papers; or where there were other 
assurances that the documents would reach the intended recipient." Id. 
Courts outside of Utah have also found that receptionists can have implied 
authority to accept service of process where that receptionist stated they could accept the 
summons. Kuhlik v. Atlantic Corp., 112F.R.D. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Direct Mail 
Specialists. Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs.. Inc.. 840 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir.1988) 
(finding service on receptionist effective where corporation was comparatively small and 
the role played by receptionist was proportionally large, and receptionist was the only one 
in the office when the process server arrived, indicating that she possessed more than 
minimal responsibility); Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maat-Schappii N.V. v. Curtiss-Wright 
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Corp., 17 F.R.D. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y.1955) (holding face-to-face encounter with corporate 
officer not required to effect service where the officer's receptionist accepted service, 
promised to deliver the papers to the proper person, and did in fact deliver the papers). 
See also Classic Cabinets v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App. 88 
This Court should find that Ms. Tonks' statement that she could accept service, 
and writing to that effect, show her implied authority to act as an agent for the registered 
agent, Ted Madsen. All the current rule requires is that the person be "authorized" or a 
"general agent". Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 4(d)(1)(E) (2008). In this case, the Court should 
find that Ms. Tonks satisfies the Rule. 
It is unknown whether Ms. Tonks immediately gave the Summons and Complaint 
to Registered Agent Ted Madsen. What is known is that in a meeting held after the 
complaint was served and before the default judgment was entered between Kyle Lind, 
Rick Sorensen, Tom Stevenson and Tom Phelps, Kyle Lind knew about the 
La Salle complaint prior to the default judgment. Phelps Aff, Tf8. This is fairly easily 
proven by an affidavit from Ms. Tonks, but Defendants chose not to provide this. Instead, 
Defendant's support the proposition that Madsen never received the Summons and 
Complaint or Notice of Judgment Lien by Madsen's affidavit which states, "I do not 
recall ever receiving the Notice..." Madsen Declaration, ^5-6. ] 
1
 Defendant argues that it changed its Registered Agent on September 11, 2008, and 
therefore did not receive a copy of the Judgment on September 24, 2008. However, 
Rule 55 only requires an entity seeking default to prove that the "defendant has been 
personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
55(b)(1)(C). The party in default need not be given notice of the entry of default. 
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen. 656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982). Defendant's 
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Registered agents have a duty to "forward to the represented entity... any 
process, notice, or demand that is served on the agent." U.C.A. §16-17-302(1) (2008). 
The fact that 1) the receptionist had implied authority to accept service, 2) she accepted 
service, and 3) Kyle Lind acknowledged receipt of the Complaint prior to the judgment 
being entered, shows that Ted Madsen received the complaint and summons. The fact 
that he did "not recall ever receiving" it, in this case, is not credible. Once received, he 
had a duty to forward it to the La Salle, which must have occurred. 
Further evidence of Defendant's inexcusable neglect is the fact that Defendant did 
nothing after counsel for Plaintiff repeatedly inquired whether Rick Sorensen, who 
represented Kyle Lind on other suits with VCS, Inc., inquired whether Sorensen 
represented La Salle Development, LLC. The Defendant concedes the following 
pertinent facts: 
"6. Sometime after March 26, 2008, VCS's attorney Tom 
Stevenson (hereinafter "Attorney Stevenson"), contacted me 
and asked if I represent La Salle. I responded that L. Kyle 
Lind had not asked me to represent La Salle. Attorney 
Stevenson did not inform me that VCS had filed suit against 
La Salle or that VCS was seeking a default judgment against 
La Salle. 
7. After the conversation with Attorney Stevenson, I 
contacted L. Kyle Lind and informed L. Kyle Lind of the 
conversation I had with VCS's attorney about La Salle. L. 
Kyle Lind stated that he did not know why VCS's attorney 
argument on this point is unavailing. In addition, the termination of the registered 
agentfftakes effect on the 31st day after the day on which it is filed." U.C.A. §16-17-
205(2) (2008). Therefore, on September 24, 2008, the change of Agent had not taken 
effect. 
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was asking about representation because as far as he knew, 
VCS had not sued La Salle." 
. . . • • • • i 
Sorensen Declaration, ffif6-7. The facts above indicate that in the meeting between the 
parties Lind acknowledged receipt of the Complaint, and even commented that he hoped 
his partner Don Hampton, did not answer it as he had in a prior case. But even if that 
were not true, after such an inquiry by attorney Stevenson about Sorensen's 
representation of La Salle Development, LLC, it may be argued that a reasonable person 
would: 1) check with his registered agent to see if a suit was delivered, 2) do a simple 
case search to see if a complaint had been filed, or 3) inquire of attorney Stevenson if a 
suit was filed. 
The Utah Supreme Court defines excusable neglect as "the exercise of 'due 
diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. 
V. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987); Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 
P.2d 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (permitting withdraws where there is a reasonable excuse 
for Defendant's failure to respond). Even if the evidence was not overwhelming that the 
Defendant was served, the Court should find even on the basis of the Defendant's 
statement of facts alone that Kyle Lind did not act as a reasonably prudent person and 
uphold the default judgment. 
R^ Defendant Did Not File the Motion to Set Aside Timely 
Defendant would show the Court that pursuant to the Court's docket, judgment 
was filed on 1 May 2008 and entered on 6 June 2008. Exhibit D. Defendants brought 
this motion on 23 January 2009. Pursuant to Rule 60, this motion was made more than 
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three (3) months after that judgment. Utah R. Civ. P , Rule 60 (2008). The Court should 
strike the Motion as untimely. 
The trial court found that a receptionist must represent themselves as holding "a 
position of authority to accept service". R. at 710, p. 7-8, 10. The Court also reasoned 
that Utah courts clearly "disfavor . . . default judgments". Id. at 11. This ruling leads to 
an absurd result which other states have wrestled with and declined to conclude. 
Essentially, any time a registered agent in this state is both an individual and that 
individual has his own business that is separate from the entity for which his is the 
registered agent, if an assistant working for that registered agent's business accepts 
service, no matter explicitly, the Defendant can defeat service merely by claiming his 
assistant never gave it to him. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, VCS respectfully requests that the Supreme Court: 
1. Reverse the Trial Court below; 
2. Find that La Salle was served the complaint on March 19, 2008; 
3. Find that VCS met its burden for summary judgment and has a valid and 
enforceable lien; 
4. Find that FDIC and Utah Community Bank failed to meet their burden for 
purposes of their cross motions for summary judgment; 
5. Order the judicial foreclosure of the nineteen lots liened by VCS within Northpark 
Meadows subdivision; 
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6. Order that VCS's lien and lis pendens be reinstated on all nineteen lots within the 
subdivision; 
7. Order that VCS's lien has superior priority to the Trust Deeds held by Utah 
Community Bank and FDIC; 
8. Reverse the award of attorney's fees to the Banks; and 
9. Award VCS its attorney's fees, costs and interest pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 38-1-18 and 15-1-1 (as previously requested, R. at 231-63, 312, 645) 
and remand to the Trial Court to determine the appropriate amount of fees. 
10. In the alternative, find that the Utah Community Bank and FDIC have been 
unjustly enriched and award VCS its attorney's fees, costs and interest pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 78B-5-825 and 15-1-1 (as previously requested, R. at 
231-63, 312, 645) and remand to the Trial Court to determine the appropriate 
amount of fees. 
11. Any other appropriate relief as determined by the Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
QUA sftslz*" 
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
VCS, Inc. 
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ADDENDA 
The following are exhibits provided for the ease of the court in referencing key 
documents related to this appeal: 
1. Selected Statute and Regulations 
2. Ruling Granting Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 27 April 2009 (R. at 209-214) 
3. Ruling on Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, 26 October, 2010 
4. Return of Service 20 Day Summons 
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EXHIBIT 1 
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SELECTED STATUTE AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 - "The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take 
effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the 
ground: also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had 
no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement 
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground." 
U.C.A. § 38-1-5 (2009). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 - "(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index 
maintained for that purpose. (2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons 
are considered to have notice of the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-9 (2011). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(b) - "Substantial compliance with the requirements of this 
chapter is sufficient to hold and claim a lien." Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(b) (2007). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) -
"(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Owner" is as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(b) "Residence" is as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter: (a) 
except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), within 180 days after the day on which the lien 
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claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7; or (b) if an owner files for 
protection under the bankruptcy laws of the United States before the expiration of the 
180-day period under Subsection (2)(a), within 90 days after the automatic stay under the 
bankruptcy proceeding is lifted or expires. 
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (2) the lien claimant shall 
file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a 
notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title 
or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action, (b) The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those 
claiming under the lien claimant to show actual knowledge under Subsection (3)(a). 
(4) (a) A lien filed under this chapter is automatically and immediately void if an action 
to enforce the lien is not filed within the time required by this section, (b) 
Notwithstanding Section 78B-2-111, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a lien that becomes void under Subsection (4)(a)." Utah Code Ann. §38-1-
11(1-4) (2011). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102 - ""Owner" means a person who: (a) contracts with a 
person who is licensed as a contractor or is exempt from licensure under Title 58, Chapter 
55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, for the construction on an owner-occupied 
residence upon real property owned by that person; (b) contracts with a real estate 
developer to buy a residence upon completion of the construction on the owner-occupied 
residence; or (c) buys a residence from a real estate developer after completion of the 
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construction on the owner-occupied residence." Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(17) (2011). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Utah Rule 4(d)(1)(E) - "Upon any corporation not herein 
otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated association which 
is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the 
complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by 
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found 
within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an 
office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within this state 
or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office or place of business." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(E) (2011)." Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(E) (2011). 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
VCS. INC.. a Utah Corporation. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, INC.. 
Defendant. 
RULING GRANTING 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE-
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 080901677 
Judge Michael D. DiReda 
On January 26, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment entered 
against it, pursuant to rule 60(b). Plaintiff submitted a memorandum in opposition, and 
Defendant filed a reply. The Court heard oral arguments on April 16, 2009. after which the 
Court took the motion under advisement. The Court now grants the motion. 
Defendant La Salle Development, Inc., is a limited liability corporation, whose registered 
agent at the time this action was filed was Ted Madsen, an accountant with no other affiliation 
with Defendant. Rule 4(d)(l )(E) provides that a corporation shall be personally served "by 
delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, 
or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process... T Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(E). 
On March 19. 2008. Plaintiff served Defendant by leaving a copy of the summons and 
complaint with Cailey Tonks, a receptionist of Madsen & Associates, CPAs, who signed the 
receipt of service "For Registered Agent Ted Madsen. " Ms. Tonks is in no way affiliated with 
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Defendant La Salle Development. Ted Madsen does not remember ever receiving the summons 
and complaint and did not provide them to Defendant. 
On June 6r 2008, the Court entered default judgment against Defendant. In ear]}' 
September, La Salle Development changed its registered agent from Ted Madsen to L. Kyle 
Lindvwho is affiliated with Defendant, In late September, Plaintiff mailed a notice of judgment 
lien to Madsen; however, Madsen does not recall receiving such notice. Defendant did not 
become aware of the default judgment until December 18, 2008, when Plaintiff served an 
application for writ of execution on L. Kyle Lind. Defendant filed its motion to set aside the 
judgment on January 26, 2009. 
Rule 60(b)(4) allows the Court to relieve a party from a final judgment if "the judgment is 
void." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Proper sendee under rule 4 is required for a court to acquire 
jurisdiction over a defendant. Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 100 P.3d 1211, 1214 (Utah 2004). 
In a case where a court fails to acquire jurisdiction due to improper service, any judgment 
rendered would be void. See id. 
The Court finds that leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with Ms. Tonics was 
an improper means of serving Defendant La Salle Development under rule 4. In this case, the 
Defendant corporation had designated Ted Madsen as its registered agent for receiving service of 
process. But Mr. Madsen was not the only option for effectuating service on Defendant. In fact, 
rule 4(d)(1)(E) designates multiple options for serving process on a corporation, namely by 
serving "an officer, a managing or genera] agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by 
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law." Ms. Tonks, as a receptionisi for the registered agent of the Defendant, does not fall within 
any of those designations. 
While there is no controlling case law on this narrow issue of service on the receptionist 
of a registered agent one case was particularly helpful in guiding the Court's ruling. In the case 
of In re Schwenke, 89 P.3d 117 (Utah 2004). the Utah Supreme Court, addressed the similar 
situation where a receptionist for the defendant corporation is served, holding thai u[g]enerally, 
'proper service is not effected by serving the corporation's receptionist.'" Id at 123. The court 
did note exceptions to this general rule, in which a receptionist may accept service on behalf of a 
corporation. 
It is important to note, however, that the facts in the present case are distinguishable from 
the scenarios contemplated in Schwenke. Here, Ms. Tonics is not a receptionist of Defendant La 
Salle Development, and is in no way affiliated with that corporation. Further, Mr. Madsen, who 
is also not affiliated with Defendant other than in his role as registered agent, is not the object of 
the service; rather, he is merely a designated proxy by which Defendant La Salle Development 
may be served. As receptionist of the registered agent's accounting firm, Ms. Tonks is one step 
further removed from the general rule in Schwenke. that "proper service is not effected by-serving 
the corporation's receptionist.'* As serving a corporation's receptionist is generally not effective 
in servine a corporation, certainly serving a receptionist of a registered agent of a corporation is 
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Evidence was presented by the Plaintiff that, despite the form of service, Defendant La 
Salle Development may have received notice of the lawsuit. However, the evidence presented by 
both sides leaves that factual issue, at best unceitain. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it 
is its "declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to allow 
trial on the merits." Locke v. Peterson. 285 P.2d 111L 1113 (Utah 1955). Moreover, this Court 
is mindful that "[jjudgments by default are not favored by the courts," and that "courts, in the 
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a 
hearing on the merits of every case." Heathmaii v. Fabian & Clendemn, 377 P.2d 189. 190 (Utah 
1962). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "a movant is entitled to have a default judgment 
set aside under rule 60(b) if (1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under 
one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense,"' Menzies 
v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480, 504 (Utah 2006). As the motion in this case was made under rule 
60(b)(4), the motion need only be "made within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The 
motion was made on January 26, 2009, which the court finds reasonable, given it was 
approximately one month after Defendant became aware of the judgment. 
The Court also finds there is a basis for granting relief under rule 60(b). Based on the 
lack of proper service, the Court never obtained jurisdiction over the Defendant. As such, the 
default judgment entered by the Court is void, which is provided as a basis for relief under 
subsection (4) of rule 60(b). 
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Finally, the Court finds thai the Defendant has sufficiently alleged a meritorious defense. 
tcThis requirement does noi sei an overly burdensome threshold: ... [Wlhere a parry presents a 
clear and specific, proffer of a defense that, if proven, would [warrant reiiefj by the ciaimani ... it 
has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense.""' Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 
480, 517 (Utah 2006). In its memorandum in support of the motion. Defendant disputed that it 
owes the amounts alleged by Plaintiff in its complaint. This is sufficient to meet the low 
threshold of presenting a meritorious defense. 
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. The 
Court's Judgment of June 6, 2008, is hereby set aside. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day of April. 2009.1 sent: a true and correct copy of the 
foreeoing ruliim to Plaintiff and Defendant as follows: 
David B. Stephenson. Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3986 Washington Blvd. 
Ogdeii, Utah 84403 
Rick L. Sorensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
5710 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
\ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
VCS, INC., a Utah company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC; 
AMERICA WEST BANK; UTAH 
COMMUNITY BANK; and DOES 1-10 
Defendant(s). 
On March 31, 2010, Plaintiff VCS, Inc. ("VCS") filed a motion for summary judgment to 
enforce its mechanic's lien against Defendants La Salle Development, LLC ("La Salle"), Utah 
CommiHihy Bank ("UCB"), and America West Bank ("FDIC") and to sue for unjust enrichment. 
Both UCB and FDIC filed oppositions to the motion along with cross-motions for summary 
judgment arguing that the lien is void and the unjust enrichment claim is not valid as to each bank, 
respectively. The Court heard oral arguments on September 20,2010. After considering the motions 
and the oral arguments, the Court grants both UCB's and FDIC's cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The Court notes that La Salle has not yet responded to Plaintiffs original motion for 
summary judgment. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that summary judgment is appropriate when there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court may consider in its determination "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any.*' Id 
The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTIOf{0 o P r> 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND * c ° L 
DEFENDANTS' CRQSSJVIOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDfcJME FILED 
Case No. 080901677 
Judge Michael D. DiRedk 
OCT 2 2010 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
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The material facts in this case are not in dispute. In March 2006. Plaintiff VCS entered into a 
contract with La Salle to develop lots located in North Park Meadows. Actual construction work 
commenced in November of that year. On January 12, 2007, UCB recorded a trust deed on the 
property, which it secured by a loan to La Salle. La Salle then orally terminated VCS in September 
2007, and VCS ceased all work on the lots. On October 24,2007, FDIC then recorded atrust deed on 
lots 31 and 32, which it too secured by a loan to La Salle. VCS filed a mechanic's lien on lots 3-22 
and 31-32 on January 29, 2008; however, VCS did not record a lis pendens at this time. On March 
12,2008, VCS filed suit against La Salle but did not name UCB or FDIC as parties. La Salle failed 
to represent itself, and the Court ordered a default judgment for VCS on June 6, 2008. VCS 
informed UCB or FDIC of this action on October 16, 2008, when VCS sent letters informing both 
banks of the judgment against La Salle. Because of issues regarding whether La Salle was properly 
served in the action, the Court then set aside the default judgment in April 2009. Shortly thereafter, 
VCS amended its complaint, added UCB and FDIC as parties to the action, and filed a lis pendens. 
On December 30, 2009, UCB then became owner of lots 5-8 and 10-22 pursuant to a foreclosure 
sale. 
Plaintiff VCS has brought this action to enforce its mechanic's lien against La Salle, UCB, 
and FDIC and also to recover from each party in quantum meruit for unjust enrichment. Each bank 
argues that the lien is void and that there is no valid unjust enrichment claim. Alternatively, UCB 
and FDIC argue that the Plaintiff has failed to establish the value of its alleged mechanic's lien. 
Depending upon the Court's analysis of the law, Plaintiff VCS has requested more time under rule 
5 6(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for further discover)7. Finally, VCS, UCB, and FDIC all 
request attorneys' fees pursuant to § 38-1-18. 
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The Court agrees with both UCB and FDIC and finds that the lien is void as to both parties 
and that there is no valid unjust enrichment claim. B ecause the Court finds the lien is void, the Court 
makes no findings regarding whether the value of the lien is proper. Furthermore, the Court denies 
Plaintiffs request for more time under rule 56(f). Finally, the Court awards attorneys' fees to both 
UCB and FDIC pursuant to § 38-1-18. The Court's reasoning is set out below. 
I. VALIDITY OF MECHANIC'S LIEN 
A mechanic's lien will be enforced if the claimant of the lien complies with the requirements 
as set forth in the Utah Code. Section 3 8-1 -7(a)(i), (ii) requires that the lien claimant file a notice of a 
lien claim within 180 days "after the day on which occurs final completion of the original contract" 
or "the last date on which substantial work was performed under the original contract." Plaintiff 
strictly complied with this requirement, filing a notice of its lien in January' 2008, only four months 
after substantial work was completed on the original contract with La Salle in September 2007. 
After filing a notice of the lien, a lien claimant must then file an action to enforce the lien 
within 180 daj's. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(2)(a). Again, Plaintiff strictly complied with this 
requirement by filing an action in March 2008 and naming La Salle as a defendant. However, 
Plaintiff failed to name UCB and FDIC as defendants. Within that same time period of 180 days, the 
statute also requires that the "lien claimant shall file for record . . . a notice of the pendency of the 
action . . . or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action 
and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action" § 38-1-1 l(3)(a) 
(emphasis added). Plaintiff did not provide UCB or FDIC with actual notice of the action until at 
least October 16, 2008—over eight months after the initial filing of the lien. Furthermore, Plaintiff 
did not name UCB or FDIC as parties to the action until April 2009—over a year after the initial 
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filing of the lien. Because Plaintiff failed to-iimely record a lis pendens within 180 days of the 
commencement of the action, the question before the Court is whether the lien is void as to UCB and 
FDIC because neither bank was added as a party to the foreclosure action nor was provided with 
actual knowledge of the action within the 180 days allowed for filing a lis pendens. 
Plaintiff VCS argues that the lien remains valid as to UCB and FDIC for three reasons: 
1) the statute should be read to only require that UCB and FDIC be added to the foreclosure action or 
have actual knowledge of the action before either bank purchases the property at the foreclosure 
sale—not within 180 days of the filing of the action; 2) Plaintiff s amended complaint naming UCB 
and FDIC as parties relates back to the date of the original pleading; and 3) Plaintiff substantially 
complied with the statute. 
1. THE MEANING OF U.CA. § 38-1-1 U3VaV 
First, Plaintiff argues that, its lien is valid against UCB and FDIC because it strictly complied 
with the requirements of the lien statute. When evaluating statutes, the Court looks at the plain 
meaning and seeks to "avoid interpretations that will render portions of the statute superfluous our 
inoperative." Hall v. State Dep f ofCorr., 2001 UT 34. Each party has interpreted §38-1-1 l(3)(a) 
based upon the statute's plain meaning and reached different results: Plaintiff argues that the 
exceptions to a void lien—namely, naming a party7 in a foreclosure action or proving actual 
knowledge of the action—are not subject to the 180 day requirement while both UCB and FDIC 
argue that the exceptions are subject to the time requirement. Because the Court finds that the 
language of the statute by itself is unclear as to whether or not the 180 day requirement applies to the 
exceptions, the Court must look at controlling precedent for an interpretation of the statute, 
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In order to justify its interpretation of § 38-1-1 l(3)(a). Plaintiff relies on the facts and holding 
of ButterfieldLumber, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 1330 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In 
Butterfield, the contractor, Butterfield. filed a mechanic* s hen on a property after Peterson Mortgage 
recorded a trust deed but before the time frame required by § 38-1-7 expired. The owner of the 
property defaulted, and Butterfield then filed an action to enforce its lien, naming Peterson Mortgage 
as a party to the action within the time frame required by § 38-1 -11. Butterfield did not record a lis 
pendens, however. Peterson Mortgage then foreclosed on the property and sold the property to a third 
party who had no knowledge of Butterfield's mechanic's lien. The question for the appellate court 
was whether the mechanic's lien attached to the proceeds of the sale of the property between 
Peterson Mortgage and the third party when the contractor failed to record a lis pendens. The Court 
held that the lien did attach to the proceeds, relying on the exceptions to filing a lis pendens listed in 
§ 38-1-11 of the Utah Code and explaining that "the section 38-1-11 protection of third party 
purchasers without notice of a mechanics5 lien foreclosure does not extend to those who acquire 
ownership with such notice [i.e., Peterson Mortgage]/5 Butterfield Lumber, 815 P.2d at 1334. 
Plaintiff VCS relies on the above language in Butterfield to justify enforcing its lien against 
UCB because UCB acquired ownership of the property over a year after it received knowledge of 
Plaintiffs suit. In this Court's view, Butterfield is distinguishable from the present case in one 
important respect: "[Bjecause Butterfield properly named and served Peterson Mortgage as a party to 
the lien foreclosure, it met the statutory requirements for preserving its lien against Peterson 
Mortgage's interest in the property in question." Butterfield Lumber, 815 P.2d at 1334. Butterfield 
completed work on the original contract on April 10. 1987. and filed suit naming Peterson Mortgage 
as a party on April 6? 1988.within the (then) twelve-month statutory timeframe outlined by § 38-1-11 
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(1988). Thus, unlike Plaintiff in the instant case, Butterfield perfected its lien against Peterson 
Mortgage within the proscribed statutory period. This critical fact makes Butterfield of little help in 
advancing Plaintiff s argument. 
When interpreting the statute, the Court is more persuaded by the facts and holding of 
Interlake Distributors, Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). hi Inter lake Ahz 
appellants—several contractors—sought to enforce their mechanics' liens against the construction 
lender, Deseret Pacific, and the current owner of the property, Old Mill. Because the appellants failed 
to record a lis pendens within the timeframe required by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1974) (amended 
1994), the Court concluded that "under the plain language of the statute, appellants5 liens are void 
against Deseret Pacific and Old Mill unless within tw>elve months from the time appellants completed 
their work, Deseret Pacific and Old Mill were either made parties to or had actual knowledge of the 
lawsuit." Interlake, 954 P.2d at 1297 (emphasis added). The Court also reasoned that "[t]he fact that 
appellants knew of the lawsuits after the statutorily required period does not support the inference 
that they knew of the lawsuit during the required period." Id, at 1298. Thus, this Court is persuaded 
that the exceptions to filing a lis pendens, namely, naming a party in an action or showing actual 
knowledge of the action, must occur within the statutory timeframe; i.e., withinl 80 days from the 
filing of the lien. 
Plaintiff has failed to show that UCB or FDIC had knowledge of its action against La Salle 
during the time allowed to file a lis pendens. The earliest evidence of any actual knowledge to which 
Plaintiff can point is letters the defendants received from Plaintiff on October 16, 2008—over two 
months after the 180 day deadline. Plaintiff argues that UCB was involved enough in the original 
contract between Plaintiff and La Salle that it should have known of the litigation: however, "the 
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statute does not permit constructive notice or inquiry notice to qualify as a substitute for a lis 
pendens, but only actual notice.'" Inierlake, 954 P.2d at 1298. Accordingly, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff did not comply with the statute in terms of UCB and FDIC and the lien is void as to both 
parties. 
2. AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Second, Plaintiff VCS argues that its amended complaint filed in April 2009 naming both 
UCB and FDIC as parties relates back to the time of the original filing of the action in March 2008. 
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "whenever the claim or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the 
original pleading." When new defendants are added as parties in an amended complaint, they must 
have an identity of interest with the original defendant. Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247. An 
identity of interest exists when parties have been "sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were 
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage." Doxey-Laton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 
(Utah 1976). 
Plaintiff contends that because UCB and FDIC were added as parties before a trial date was 
set or any discovery had commenced in the action that they had an identity of interest with La Salle. 
The Court is unconvinced by this argument. First of all, as was already discussed, Plaintiff has 
offered no evidence that either UCB or FDIC knew about the foreclosure action before the 180 day 
time frame established by statute and, therefore, they could not have been "sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings.'' Id. Furthermore, the purpose behind the relation back doctrine is to "prevent a 
mechanical use of a statute of limitations . . . to prevent adjudication of a claim." Id. The Utah 
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Supreme Court in AAA Fencing Co. v. Rainiree Dev. & Energ)> Co. specifically analyzed the 
mechanic's lien timeframe as a substantive restriction on an action and not as a statute of limitations. 
714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). Relying, on this reasoning, the Utah Court of Appeals in Diehl 
Lumber Transportation Inc. v. Mickelson held: "Viewing the statutory time limit as strictly 
jurisdictional, it follows that once the time had expired, the court lacked authority to revive the hen 
by permitting amendment under Rule 15(c)." 802 P.2d 739, 744 (Utah Ct. App 1990). Accordingly, 
the relation back doctrine cannot be used to revive a voided mechanic's lien. Furthermore, were the 
Court to allow an amended complaint to relate back to the time of the original filing, the Court 
would be rendering the requirement to file a lis pendens completely useless, as a claimant would 
have no reason to file a lis pendens within the statutory timeframe knowing that the complaint can be 
amended to add parties later without it. 
3. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
Finally, Plaintiff VCS argues that despite the fact that it did not strictly comply with the 
requirements of § 38-1-11(3 )(a), the lien should be enforced against LICB and FDIC because Plaintiff 
substantially complied with the mechanic's lien statute by filing its lien and commencing its action to 
enforce it against La Salle within the statutory timeframe. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that although 
it failed to file a lis pendens, it did add both UCB and FDIC as parties to the action before UCB 
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, thus complying with the policy behind the lis pendens. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that it had no reason to file a lis pendens because it was already in possession 
of a default judgment against La Salle before the statutory deadline. 
In support of its argument, Plaintiff relies on the purpose of the mechanic's lien statute, 
which is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or 
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materials." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. And Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). 
Because of this'overarching policy. Utah courts "have recognized that substantial compliance with 
[the mechanic's lien] provisions is all that is required." Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990). While it is true that u[a] lien once acquired by labor 
performed on a building .. . should not . . . be defeated by technicalities... when no rights of others 
are infringed," the Utah Supreme Court has only allowed such a broad reading of the statute when 
"no express command of the statute is disregarded." Id. at 744, Plaintiff did not comply with the 
express commands of § 38-1 -11 (3)(a) to preserve the validity of its lien against UCB and FDIC. By 
not filing a lis pendens and by not adding either defendant as a party to the original action within the 
180-day timeframe, Plaintiff disregarded more than mere technicalities. Furthermore, Plaintiffs 
contention that it had no reason to believe a lis pendens was necessary also fails. Both FDIC and 
UCB recorded trust deeds on the property well before Plaintiff brought its action against La Salle. 
Plaintiff should have been aware, then, that both parties had a competing interest in the property. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs void mechanic's lien is not revived by mere substantial compliance with the 
statute. 
Accordingly, because there are no material issues of genuine fact regarding whether Plaintiff 
perfected its lien against UCB and FDIC, the Court grants the defendants5 cross-motions for 
summary judgment in regard to the invalidity of the lien. 
4. UNJUST.ENRICHMENT 
Plaintiff VCS also seeks summary judgment with respect to its claims against UCB 
and FDIC for unjust enrichment. Generally, "one must first exhaust his legal remedies before he ma)? 
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recover on the basis of the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit" Knighl v. Post,. 748 P.2d 1097 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Although Plaintiff may have successfully perfected its lien against La Salle, 
Plaintiff failed to adequately perfect its lien against both UCB and FDIC because it did not comply 
with § 38-1-11. Therefore, Plaintiff did not exhaust its legal remedies and cannot recover on the 
basis of quantum meruit. Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the Court grants both defendants' cross-motions for summary 
judgment in regard to the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim. 
4. RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Plaintiff VCS has requested more time under rule 56(f) for discover}/. The Court considers 
various factors when determining when a rule 56(f) continuance is warranted, including, "an 
examination of the party's rule 56(f) affidavit to determine whether the discovery sought will 
uncover disputed material facts that will prevent the grant of summary judgment or if the part}/ 
requesting discover}7 is simply on a 'fishing expedition,'" and "whether the party opposing the 
summary judgment motion has had adequate time to conduct discovery and has been conscientious 
in pursuing such discovery." Overstock.com, Inc. v. Smartbargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah 2008) 
(citing Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co., 145 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). Furthermore.the 
Court will find a requesting party dilator}7 unless the part}7 explains why the evidence could not be 
previously obtained and that the evidence sought is not in the requesting party's exclusive control. 
Jones v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 146. 
Although the Court recognizes that the requirement to file an affidavit "should be applied 
liberally," the Court is "unwilling to 'spare litigants from their own lack of diligence."' Callioux, 745 
P.2d at 841 (quoting Hebert v. Wichiund, 744 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1984)). In its reply 
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memorandum, Plaintiff VCS requested discovery time to determine when Defendant UCB gained 
actual knowledge of the mechanic's lien. The Court recognizes that this fact is material and relevant; 
however, VCS failed to file an affidavit and did not explain why this information could not be 
obtained previously. Furthermore, evidence of whether Plaintiff gave Defendants actual knowledge 
of the lawsuit before October 2008 is partially within Plaintiffs control. Therefore, the Court denies 
the request for a continuance under rule 56(f). 
5. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that there are no issues of genuine fact and 
that Defendants UCB and FDIC are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court 
denies Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants UCB's and FDIC's cross-motions for 
summary judgment. 
6. ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to § 38-1-18, Defendants are awarded reasonable attorneys' fees. Both UCB and 
FDIC shall submit affidavits in accordance with rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
regarding each parties' attornej's5 fees, respectivel}'. 
Dated this Qty day of October, 2010. 
Michael D. DiRe 
District Court Judge 
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H. Thomas Stevenson, No. 630: 
STEVENSON &. SMITH D .C 
3936 Washington 3ivc 
Ogder, Utan E^4C3 
Teieohone: (801) 399-9910 
i-?d i^QCW.:,' 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNT 
VCS, INC.. a Utan Corooration SUMMONS (20 DAY) 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
i CIVLNO. C^O 'HOUOTT 
| JUDGE: °tfe~\ V . ^ . W \ f c 
LA SALLE DEVELOPMENT, LLC 
Defendant. 
THE STATE Or UTAH i 0 \ H~ A30vr~ NAM- j DziF-NDANTfS): 
LsS-aUe Development. LLC 
Ted A. Madsen, Registered Agent 
684 E. Vine Street. #2 
Murray, UT B4107 ^ c : . s „. ^ M c 5. 
You are hereby summoned ano required to file with ine cierk of tns aoove Court 
at Seoond District Coun. 2525 Grant Avenue. Ogden. UT &M01. a written Answer to 
the attached Complaint, and to serve upon or maii to H. Thomas Stevenson, of 
Stevenson & Smith., P.O.. 3985 Washington 3ivd., Ogden. Utah 8^403. Plaintiffs 
attorney, a ooov of your Answer within twenty '20) cays after service of this summons 
uoon you. 
If vou fail to so answer, judgment DV default wili oe taken aaainst vou for the 
relief demanded in the Comoiaint which has oeen filed with the cien; of the aoove Coir 
and a copy of which is attached anc herewith servec uoon you. 
DATED this ;-^ - cay of March, 2005 
i noFRes^tevenson 
Attorney to: Plaintiff 
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